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HOW ETHICAL IS ABRAHAM'S 
"SUSPENSION OF THE ETHICAL"? 
Joseph A. Magno 
Early in his discussion of Fear and Trembling's Problema I-"Is there .i Teleolog-
ical Suspension of the Ethical?"-Kierkegaard puts to himself the question, 
whether this story [of Abraham's command by God to sacrifice his son, 
Isaac] contains any higher expression for the ethical that can ethically 
explain his behavior, can ethically justify his suspending the ethical 
obligation to the son, but without moving beyond the teleology of the 
ethical. I 
How did Kierkegaard resolve this self-imposed query as to the ethicality of 
Abraham's act of faith? That, as those at all familiar with Kierkegaard's Fear 
and Trembling know only too well, is precisely the exegetical case in point! For 
among those scholars who venture to interpret Kierkegaard herein, we may 
generically list no less than three widely divergent views. First, there are those 
who contend that Kierkegaard supplies absolutely no ethical warrant for 
Abraham's intended faith-act, and so view Abraham's suspension of the ethical 
irrationalistically, that is, as opposing the ethical. 2 At the other extreme are those 
who argue that while Abraham's faith-act cannot be reduced to sheer ethical 
justification, since on such a reduction Abraham's act would not be afaith-act, 
Kierkegaard nonetheless shows that there is no opposition between Abraham's 
faith and ethics, and so regard Abraham's suspension of the ethical in a sup-
rarationalist light, that is, as transcending, not negating, the ethical,3 Finally, 
there is what I shall designate a 'third force,' whose principal, shared contention 
is that it is beside the point to debate whether Kierkegaard does or does not 
ethically vindicate Abraham, that in truth Kierkegaard is primarily about some-
thing else entirely. What this something else is receives many and varying 
interpretations, but of these the following seem most typical. Thus, some maintain 
that the purpose of Fear and Trembling is "not to defend faith .... The book is 
a polemical slam against those [rationalists] who twaddle about 'going beyond' 
faith."4 Others hold that Kierkegaard means to justify Abraham not in virtue of 
reason, but rather in virtue of faith, essentially through arguing that "by faith, 
what appears absurd ... [becomes] transformed."5 Lastly, some subscribe to the 
opinion that "Kierkegaard's main concern is with contrasting faith as mental 
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assent with faith as a way of life, i.e., with truth as a quality of life not as a 
quality of propositions."6 
Now of these three classes of opinion-irrationalist, suprarationalist, and 'third 
force'-the latter, I submit, must be dismissed as a legitimate generic interpre-
tation of Kierkegaard's primary intent in Fear and Trembling. I underscore 
"primary" because, while I am prepared to concede that this 'third force' has 
unearthed what for Kierkegaard may be significant secondary intentions, I cannot 
agree that there is textual warrant for its claim that Kierkegaard considered a 
rational defense of Abraham's ethicality oflittle or no importance. That a distinc-
tion must be drawn between Kierkegaard's primary and likely secondary intents 
may be seen through closer inspection of Kierkegaard's notion of ethics in Fear 
and Trembling. 
How does Kierkegaard envision the ethical in this work? As has been justly 
observed, it is difficult precisely to say. 7 Yet, whatever Kierkegaard may spec-
ifically mean by the ethical herein, it is at least patent that to him the ethical is 
all of a piece with what he terms "the universal." Consider the following 
exemplary passages: 
The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to 
everyone, which from another angle means that it applies at all times. 
It rests immanent in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its T~ho<; 
[end, purpose] but is itself the T~ho<; for everything outside itself, and 
when the ethical has absorbed this into itself, it goes not further. 8 
If the ethical-that is, social morality-is the highest.. . then no 
categories are needed other than what Greek philosophy had or what 
can be deduced from them by consistent thought. 9 
The ethical as such is the universal; as the universal it is in tum the 
disclosed. 10 
From these passages I think we may safely gather that, however else Kier-
kegaard may view the ethical, he minimally regards it as involving (1) the 
normative universal--4:ategories of right and wrong conduct applicable to all, 
irrespective of temporal and local circumstances, (2) the immanent--4:ategories 
which neither admit of nor require higher categories of conduct, (3) the intellig-
ible--4:ategories inherently understandable by all, and (4) the public--4:ategories 
inherently communicable to all. In a word, in Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard 
envisions the ethical as expressive of autonomous normative categories, intrinsi-
cally understandable by and therefore communicable to all persons. 
Moreover, if the preceding represents at least Kierkegaard's minimal appreci-
ation of ethics in Fear and Trembling, we may further infer that in this work 
he construes the ethical as decidedly the province of reason. For qua universal, 
the ethical is perforce a function of reason, since the universal as such is reason's 
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object. More to the point, the ethical is a function of reason's normative judgment 
to the effect that, "X is good (or bad) because X does (or does not) conform to 
universal prescription Y." 
But given the necessary connection of ethics to reason in Fear and Trembling, 
it becomes clear why this 'third force' must be disallowed as a permissible 
interpretation of Kierkegaard' s primary intent in this opus: if Kierkegaard regards 
ethics as the normative expression of reason-as the ethico-rational, if you 
will-any determination of Abraham's ethicality can only be primarily resolved 
insofar as his conduct accords with the dictates of reason. Nor, for that matter, 
does it ultimately matter whether Kierkegaard consciously made the latter intent 
his primary intent. What does ultimately matter is that, in view of the necessary 
and subordinate relation of ethics to reason herein, Kierkegaard ipso facto com-
mits himself to determining how Abraham's faith stands vis-a-vis the rational, 
or better yet, the ethico-rational. In short, either Kierkegaard does ethico-ration-
ally vindicate Abraham within the textual perimeters of Fear and Trembling, or 
he does not. There is no third alternative. 
Finally, and in a similar vein, neither does it particularly matter that Kierkegaard 
penned this book under a pseudonym-Johannes de Silenti~thereby making 
it reasonable to assume, as has often been noted, that the book does not entirely 
reflect his true position on the faith/ethics relationship. II Even granting this 
assumption, it has no real bearing on our present inquiry. For what we are 
presently about is ascertaining, not Kierkegaard's definitive estimate of the faith/ 
ethico-rational relationship, 12 but rather and simply what he has to say about this 
relationship in Fear and Trembling. Thus, the purpose of this inquiry is quite 
modest: it is solely to assess the compatibility of faith and ethico-reason within 
the pages of Fear and Trembling. 
On this reckoning, then, there remain but two interpretive possibilities, 
irrationalism or suprarationalism. Which interpretation does Fear and Trembling 
warrant? My answer is irrationalism. However, before proceeding to argue this 
answer-and indeed, so that we might proceed to argue this answer-it will be 
necessary, first, to clarify our earlier mention of irrationalism as a point of view 
"opposed to" the ethical. Exactly what is meant by "opposed" in this context? 
One cannot exactly say. Typically, irrationalism is taken to denote that which 
is "contrary to reason. "13 But such a characterization is notoriously imprecise. 14 
Be this as it may, the fact is that when critics see fit to adjudge Fear and 
Trembling "contrary to reason," they invariably mean to suggest either (1) that 
the work contradicts reason, or (2) that the work is simply meaningless. Such 
being these critics' primary senses of irrationalism, we need only inquire as to 
Fear and Trembling's susceptibility to either or both of these senses. Should 
Fear and Trembling prove immune to both species of irrationalism, we may rest 
assured that, whatever other senses "contrary to reason" may permit, this work 
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is neither contradictory nor meaningless in its presentation of the faith/ethico-
rational relationship--and that, to my mind, is more than sufficient to establish 
this work as not contrary to reason. 
But specifically what is meant by these two senses of irrationalism? How do 
they differ from one another? In fact, do they differ from one another? Toward 
answering these questions, consider, first, the contradictory assertion, "A is not 
A." This is evidently contrary to reason and therefore irrational. But it is not 
thereby meaningless. Far from it. For the assertion presupposes recognition that 
a term with defining property "A," which is only to say, a term which means 
"A," is being affirmed and denied at the same time and in the same respect. In 
other words, a term's meaningfulness is a necessary condition of contradiction 
itself. The assertion, "A is meaningless," on the other hand, is another matter 
altogether. This assertion entails nothing less than the utter inaccessibility of 
"A" to any and all evidential verification; and, since knowledge is perforce a 
function of such verification, the absolute unknowability of "A." Now what is 
per se unknowable can be neither affirmed nor denied, in that there is, cognitively 
speaking, literally nothing to affirm or deny. But what can be neither affirmed 
nor denied cannot, of course, be contradicted. Hence, the meaning, distinction, 
and fundamental irreducibility of these two senses of irrationalism to one another. 
In light of this clarification, I may now specify the precise sense in which I 
account Fear and Trembling an irrationalist statement. In the following section, 
I shall argue, against the prevalent irrationalist persuasion, that this work is not 
vulnerable to the verdict of irrationalism by reason of contradiction, that, in 
truth, there exists no inherent opposition between Abraham's faith and ethico-
reason. Proponents of this sense of irrationalism have, in my opinion, failed to 
exploit Fear and Trembling'S exegetical potential and, to that extent, have sold 
this work far too short. But invulnerability to contradiction does not in itself 
insure success against the charge of irrationalism, as we have indicated. Thus, 
in the final section, I shall explore Fear and Trembling's susceptibility to the 
second species of irrationalism, that by reason of meaninglessness. I shall show 
that the demonstration of a meaningful relation between Abraham's faith and 
ethico-reason hinges on this work's capacity to furnish probabilistic evidence 
supportive of Abraham's faith. But, as I shall further show, this work neither 
does nor can furnish such evidence. So that, in the end, Fear and Trembling, 
notwithstanding the noncontradictory status of its treatment of faith and ethico-
reason, is an irrational document, susceptible to the verdict of irrationalism under 
the aspect of meaninglessness. 
I 
That many find Fear and Trembling conspicuously irrationalistic is readily 
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understandable from the fact that it is liberally sprinkled throughout with passages 
such as these: 
The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he meant to murder 
Isaac; the religious expression is that he meant to sacrifice Isaac-but 
precisely in this contradiction is the anxiety that can make a person 
sleepless .... '5 
[F]aith [is] a paradox that makes a murder into a holy and God-pleasing 
act, a paradox ... which no thought can grasp, because faith begins pre-
cisely where thought stops .... 16 
Faith is precisely the paradox that the single individual as the single 
individual is higher than the [ethical] universal, is justified before it, 
not as inferior to it but as superior .... This position cannot be mediated, 
for all mediation takes place only by virtue of the universal; it is and 
remains for all eternity a paradox, impervious to thought. 17 
Abraham represents faith and [is] therefore ... either a murderer or a man 
of faith. IS 
Were these and like sentiments indicative of Kierkegaard's sole sentiments on 
the faithlethico-rational relationship in Fear and Trembling, one would be hard 
pressed, I submit, not to dismiss this work as hopelessly irrationalistic. In actu-
ality, though, Kierkegaard is not content to leave the matter at that. Well into 
the book, subsequent to yet another of those citations which appear utterly to 
preclude any possible link between faith and ethico-reason, Kierkegaard asserts 
that, 
From this it does not follow that the ethical should be invalidated; rather, 
the ethical receives a completely different expression, a paradoxical 
expression, such as, for example, that love to God may bring the knight 
of faith to give his love to the neighbor-an expression opposite to that 
which, ethically speaking, is duty. 19 
For present purposes, two things are especially noteworthy about this passage. 
First, Kierkegaard's initial sentence-"From this it does not follow that the 
ethical should be invalidated"--can hardly be construed as anything other than 
a suprarationalist assertion. If, as Kierkegaard declares, in faith the ethical is 
not invalidated, he can only mean to imply thereby that in faith the ethical 
persists and is in some sense operative-a perfectly apposite description of 
suprarationalism. The second striking feature about this passage is that, 
immediately subsequent to this suprarationalist assertion, Kierkegaard appends 
the statement, "the ethical receives a completely different expression ... an expres-
sion opposite to that which, ethically speaking, is duty," which seems to belie 
his original, suprarationalist assertion, and so to recapitulate Fear and Trembl-
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ing's ostensibly irrationalist motif. 
What are we to make of these seemingly incongruous assertions? Unfortunately, 
there appears to be no hope of ascertaining Kierkegaard's actual intent here, 
since nowhere, as far as I can determine, does he volunteer such information. 
We have, it would seem, no more to go on than the passage itself, and what we 
might interpretively infer therefrom. 
As to interpreting this passage, let me first call attention to the passage's 
potential exegetical significance. Far from being an irrelevant and/or gratuitous 
gloss on Kierkegaard's part, the passage actually serves as a concrete test case, 
so to speak, of the compatibility of Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion with 
all seemingly irrationalist utterances in Fear and Trembling. For insofar as the 
passage's subsequent assertion seems to court irrationalism, any reconciliation 
between the latter assertion and the initial suprarationalist assertion would effec-
tively mean the reconciliation of faith and ethico-reason in Fear and Trembling 
writ large. 
But a determination of such re!):oncilability itself presupposes the legitimacy 
of Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion. By legitimacy here I understand a 
demonstration establishing that this assertion is not merely arbitrary or question-
begging, that there exists evidence supportive of its claim to be in keeping with 
ethico-reason. What would count as such evidence? Let me suggest a demonst-
ration establishing that this assertion neither contradicts ethico-reason nor is in 
itself meaningless--in other words, a demonstration showing that this assertion 
is unsusceptible to the verdict of irrationalism in either of the aforesaid senses. 
To this end, I shall first consider whether Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion 
is liable to an irrationalist estimate by reason of contradiction, then consider 
same by reason of meaninglessness. 
To demonstrate that Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion does not contradict 
ethico-reason, is effectively to demonstrate that Abraham's act of faith, though 
qua faith-act beyond reason, yet (a) does not contravene the ethico-rational 
proscription of murder, because (b) his faith-act is consistent with, and therefore 
justifiable in virtue of, a positive ethico-rational precept. 
Furthermore, since the issue is murder, said demonstration requires an unex-
ceptionable statement of what murder essentially is. Accordingly, I think we 
may safely suggest that, whatever the multifarious species and contexts of murder, 
in essence it consists of the premeditated (i.e., voluntary and deliberated) and 
unjust taking of human life. Now while each term of this definition-'premedi-
tated,' 'unjust,' and 'taking of human life' -is, I maintain, indispensable to an 
adequate generic characterization of murder, certainly the most indispensable of 
these is the qualifier, 'unjust.' That is to say, murder is specifically wrong 
because it designates an action egregiously opposed to justice. 
On this specification, we may now say that any would-be defense of Kier-
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kegaard's suprarationalist assertion must establish (a) that Abraham's faith-act 
does not contradict the ethico-rational proscription of murder, precisely because 
(b) his faith-act is consistent with, and therefore justifiable in virtue of, the 
positive ethico-rational precept of justice. The following, I believe, shows just 
such consistency to obtain. 
If God is author of life and death-and there is certainly nothing to prevent 
our assuming as much-it follows that God may give and take life sans injustice. 
This conclusion, be it noted, pertains unqualifiedly even to innocent human life. 
The so-called "state of innocence" here denotes the absence of moral fault, and 
hence exemption from what theologians are wont to call "moral death." This 
state, however, does not entail exemption from physical death, which qua phys-
ical, bears no necessary relation to one's moral status. Whence, as author of life 
and death, God may justly elect to take even innocent human life. 
Moreover, should God so choose to take human life, innocent or no, God 
may choose to do so through human mediation sans injustice. This follows from 
the principle that what is rightfully one's own may be justly conferred upon or 
delegated to another. Hence, God could legitimately command a person, in His 
stead, to take even innocent human life, and the person so enjoined would be 
at once obligated and justified thereto: obligated, in that God has commanded 
him; justified, in that God has justly commanded him. 
Now murder, we have noticed, is morally wrong specifically and ultimately 
because it contravenes the ethico-rational precept of justice. But anyone acting 
in accord with God's command to take human life acts justly, as we have seen; 
and anyone who so acts subserves the ethico-rational principle of justice; whence, 
anyone who so acts is not and indeed cannot be adjudged a murderer. There is, 
then, no inherent contradiction between Abraham's faith-act and ethico-reason;2o 
and Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion is not susceptible to the charge of 
irrationalism by dint of contradiction. 
But granting that Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion has been found non-
contradictory to ethico-reason, how reconcilable is this assertion with his 'sub-
sequent assertion,' which, we recall, epitomizes the seemingly contradictory 
association between faith and ethico-reason in Fear and Trembling? The answer 
is that these assertions are in contradiction only if we regard Abraham's doings 
apart from the supposition of his faith. Apart from this supposition, Abraham's 
actions become "completely different" than what is prescribed by ethico-reason, 
and Abraham is a murderer. Suppose faith, however, and Abraham's conduct 
becomes consonant with the ethico-rational standard of justice, and Abraham 
stands vindicated. And what permits this all-important supposition? Precisely 
the foregoing demonstration that Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion is not 
irrationalistic by virtue of contradiction. In short, if, as has been shown, there 
exists no contradiction in supposing Abraham's faithfulness, then neither does 
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there exist any reason not to grant the reconcilability of these assertions on the 
supposition of Abraham's faithfulness. 
II 
There remains to be considered the second sense of irrationalism, that by dint 
of meaninglessness. To see how Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion fares 
on this sense, we must reintroduce the fact that the preceding demonstration 
reposes on the supposition that Abraham is verily a man of faith. Now this 
supposition, we noticed, was permissible in that its acceptance proved noncon-
tradictory. As such, the preceding demonstration may be taken as internal evi-
dence supportive of said supposition, that is, evidence to the effect that there is 
nothing logically amiss or inconsistent in supposing Abraham's faithfulness. 
Positively stated, the preceding demonstration effectively shows that Abraham's 
conduct could be in line with ethico-reason. But to show that something could 
be the case, is not of course to show that something actually is the case. Yet 
the latter is precisely what must be demonstrated if we are to establish the 
meaningfulness of Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion. Hence, in this sec-
tion, the task is to investigate whether Abraham's behavior actually does conform 
to the prescriptions of ethico-reason. 
To demonstrate such conformity, however, is effectively to show that there 
exists, not just internal evidence supportive thereof, but external evidence, as 
well. External evidence here denotes concrete behavioral evidence to the effect 
that Abraham did act in faith. Merely to suppose that Abraham did so act-how-
ever noncontradictory this supposition-is implicitly to assert that no behavioral 
(external) evidence can support this supposition. But if absolutely nothing can 
count as external, behavioral evidence that Abraham is a man of faith, and if 
meaning is perforce a function of such evidence, then the supposition that 
Abraham acted in faith (and therefore that his conduct conforms to ethico-reason) 
is effectively meaningless. And in this event, Kierkegaard's suprarationalist 
assertion, notwithstanding its noncontradictory status, would be yet subject to 
the verdict of irrationalism by reason of meaninglessness. 
For this reason, then, it is incumbent upon us to examine whether any external 
or behavioral evidence supports the supposition of Abraham's faith. But no 
sooner do we reach this conclusion than we meet a perhaps obvious objection. 
Succinctly put, the objection is based on the epistemic truism that faith-claims, 
qua faith-claims, are ipso facto irreducible to evidential verification. If so, any 
would-be quest after external evidence of Abraham's faithfulness is seemingly 
doomed from the start. So that the only apparent alternative is to own that 
Kierkegaard's faith-supposition is unsusceptible to external evidential support, 
and thus that his suprarationalist assertion is, from the start, irrationalistic by 
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reason of meaninglessness. 
I would suggest that this frequently voiced objection against the rational evin-
cibility of faith-claims fails to differentiate two argumentive categories of evi-
dence. Indeed, to maintain that faith is per se irreducible to evidence is in 
actuality to affirm that faith is per se indemonstrable: that faith is by definition 
unsupportable by argumentation whose conclusion is necessary and certain. Faith 
is unsupportable by demonstrative argument because as such faith's object 
exceeds reason. So that to purport to demonstrate what is of faith is either to 
lapse into contradiction, or else to reduce an object of faith to an object of reason. 
But to disallow, as we certainly must, the reducibility offaith to reason is not 
necessarily to disallow the existence of evidence supportive of faith. It is only 
and of necessity to disallow the existence of demonstratively supportive evidence. 
There yet remains, I contend, at least the possibility of advancing evidence for 
faith-claims which, though nondemonstrative, may nonetheless be supportive. 
What might this nondemonstrative albeit supportive evidence be? Invoking a 
distinction well known to philosophers past and present, I would propose probable 
evidence, to wit, evidence which supports the likelihood or plausibility of a 
given proposition. Pursuing evidence of this more modest ilk in behalf of faith-
claims is not in principle to reduce faith to evidence. Faith's categorical autonomy, 
its definitional transcendence of the evidence, is preserved, and the search for 
evidence of Abraham's faith becomes merely an attempt to show that the suppos-
ition of his faith is in some sense intellectually respectable, if not intellectually 
provable. In a word, nothing prohibits inquiry into the existence of external 
evidence supportive of Abraham's faithfulness-provided, that is, that we under-
stand thereby evidence serving as foundation of probable argumentation. Let us 
now see if Fear and Trembling affords such evidence. 
As a matter of recorded fact, the Kierkegaard of Fear and Trembling was 
well aware of the social and moral necessity of detecting behavioral evidence 
of the authentically faithful. He notes that, on the pretext of being inspired by 
faith, "there are those who ... would abandon themselves like unmanageable ani-
mals to selfish appetites." For this reason, he continues, a person must "de-
monstrate21 that he does not belong to them."22 And how does one so prove 
oneself? In one primary way, answers Kierkegaard: insofar as the faithful experi-
ences "fear and trembling" over "being unable to make himself understandable 
to others."23 Such is Kierkegaard's proposed criterion of genuine faithfulness. 
How adequate is it as probable evidence of Abraham's faithfulness? 
To begin with, it is important that we understand what Kierkegaard has in 
mind by the expression "fear and trembling," since he regards these sentiments 
as the appropriate and distinctive response of the faithful to his inability to make 
his actions understandable to others. In the context of Fear and Trembling, there 
can be little doubt that by "fear" Kierkegaard understands "anxiety," specifically 
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a state of unrest or inner tunnoil as to the ethical justifiability of one's conduct/4 
and that by "trembling" he means the dramatic, physical manifestation of this 
anxiety, and thus something of secondary, derivative significance. Anxiety, 
accordingly, is synonymous with Kierkegaard's use of the tenn, fear, in Fear 
and Trembling; and since trembling is causally subsequent to fear, it follows 
that for all intents our inquiry into the probability of Kierkegaard's criterion of 
the faithful resolves to this: just how distinctive of Abraham's faith is such 
anxiety as a response to his unintelligibility to others? 
I believe the answer must be in the negative, and for three principal reasons. 
In the first place, while it is highly likely that, given the gravity of his intended 
faith-act, Abraham's unintelligibility to others would elicit in him the sentiment 
of anxiety as to the justifiability of his act, any such likelihood itself presupposes 
Abraham's faithfulness, and so cannot constitute probable evidence for his faith-
fulness. In a word, on this objection, the question of Abraham's faithfulness is 
patently begged. 
Then again, it is difficult to see why such anxiety is any more indicative of 
Abraham's faithfulness than of his non-faithfulness. I suspect we have all had 
occasion to feel ill at ease over the justifiability of certain of our deeds in 
consequence of others' incomprehension. But I wonder how often we have 
experienced a need to regard our unrest at these times as significative of our 
faithfulness? On this objection, then, Kierkegaard's criterion of the faithful, even 
as probable evidence, is far too vague to serve as a discriminative test of the 
faithful, and at worst, becomes an open invitation to moral and social anarchy. 
The final and, in my view, most critical objection specifically concerns Kier-
kegaard's referral to the unintelligibility of Abraham's conduct to others. This 
reference is particularly injurious to his criterion of faith because it effectively 
situates Abraham's conduct beyond the pale of any and all evidential support, 
such that nothing can count as the requisite external evidence of the Patriarch's 
faithfulness. But, as has been seen (see pages 4,8), if Abraham's faithfulness is 
radically unsusceptible to external support, and meaning is perforce a function 
of such support, then Kierkegaard's assertion as to Abraham's faithfulness 
becomes irremediably meaningless. 
For these principal reasons, I conclude that there is no choice but to allow 
that the supposition of Abraham's faith cannot be even probabilistic ally supported, 
and hence that Kierkegaard's suprarationalist assertion must be accounted irra-
tional ultimately and properly by reason of meaninglessness. 
With this conclusion, Kierkegaard's question as to the ethicality of Abraham's 
conduct, with which we began this inquiry, is resolved. For if, as we have 
shown, Abraham's ethicality hinges on the reconcilability of Kierkegaard's sup-
rarationalist assertion and his subsequent, seemingly irrationalist assertion; and 
if, moreover, the establishment of such reconcilability was itself shown to hinge 
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on a prior demonstration of the unsusceptibility of Kierkegaard' s suprarationalist 
assertion to either species of irrationalism; then, having just demonstrated said 
assertion's failure to escape this final test of irrationalism, we thereby prove the 
irreconcilability of both assertions-and therefore, in answer to Kierkegaard's 
question, the radical unethicality of Abraham's conduct. This question having 
been resolved, our analysis of Abraham's ethicality as told in Fear and Trembling 
is brought to a close. 
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